Volume 13
Issue 1 Winter 1973
Winter 1973

Prerequisite of a Man-Made Diversion in the Appropriation of
Water Rights - State ex. rel. Reynolds v. Miranda
Channing R. Kury

Recommended Citation
Channing R. Kury, Prerequisite of a Man-Made Diversion in the Appropriation of Water Rights - State ex.
rel. Reynolds v. Miranda, 13 Nat. Resources J. 170 (1973).
Available at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nrj/vol13/iss1/10

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UNM Digital Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Natural Resources Journal by an authorized editor of UNM Digital Repository. For
more information, please contact amywinter@unm.edu, lsloane@salud.unm.edu, sarahrk@unm.edu.

COMMENT
THE PREREQUISITE OF A MAN-MADE DIVERSION
IN THE APPROPRIATION OF WATER RIGHTS STATE ex. rel. REYNOLDS v. MIRANDA*
The appropriation doctrine in water law is based on the principle
that he who uses water beneficially gains rights to use water in the
future. The doctrine is in contrast with the riparian doctrine which
grants water rights to owners of land adjacent to rivers and streams.
Through appropriation, water rights in a river may be gained without
ownership of any adjacent land. An owner of river-bank property in a
riparian jurisdiction has water rights although he may never have
used the river water.
A man-made diversion is generally required in order to perfect
water rights by appropriation' and, as a practical matter, diversions
are generally necessary for efficient use regardless of the legal
requirement. However, some beneficial uses can function without a
diversion and the users have occasionally fought the diversion
requirement. The results of these cases often have turned on whether
the court thought the claim was based in riparian or appropriation
law. If the water is beneficially used, the claim is properly an
appropriation claim and not a riparian claim, because the claim is not
based on the locational nexus of stream and property but rather on the
application of water to beneficial use. The position taken by many
courts that a diversion is necessary is unfortunate, since it has served
to defeat claims made on the basis of beneficial use unaided by
artificial diversion, and it seems difficult to logically differentiate such
uses from those accomplished with the aid of an artificial diversion. As
a result, a conflict has emerged between the concept of beneficial use
and the diversion requirement.
The New Mexico Supreme Court, in the case of State ex rel.
Reynolds v. Miranda,2 has resolved the conflict in favor of the
diversion requirement. This comment will discuss the implications
and logic of the court's decision.
In 1969 Lorenzo Miranda filed a declaration of ownership of water
rights and applied for a change in the point of diversion in order to
*83 N.M. 443, 493 P.2d 409 (1972).
1. Hutchins, Background and Modern Developments in State Water-Rights Law, in 1 Water
and Water Rights f 20.3, 22.2 (R. Clark ed. 1967); 1 W. Hutchins, Water Rights Laws in the
Nineteen Western States 366 (1971); F. Trelease, Cases and Materials on Water Law 28 (1967); 1
S. Wiel, Water Rights in the Western States §§ 364-367 (3rd ed. 1911).
2. 83 N.M. 443,493 P.2d 409(1972).
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drill two wells for irrigation. Miranda's declaration was based on a
claim he said had been perfected by his predecessors prior to 1907
(when the New Mexico statutory water law 3 came into effect) by the
grazing of cattle on grass in the Abo Wash (Socorro County) and the
harvesting of such grass for winter use. Sometime after World War I,
an arroyo formed in the wash and the natural irrigation declined.
With his suit, Miranda sought the State's permission to use his
purported water rights by drilling into the Rio Grande Underground
Water Basin. The controversy was limited by stipulation to the issue
of the diversion requirement, thus avoiding the issues of abandonment
and forfeiture. Miranda presented no evidence that any man-made
diversion was constructed or used in perfecting the claim. The New
Mexico Supreme Court dismissed Miranda's claims, holding that
"man-made diversion, together with intent to apply water to beneficial use and actual application of the water to beneficial use, is
necessary to claim water rights by appropriation in New Mexico for
'4
agricultural purposes. "
The New Mexico Supreme Court thus adopted the general rule of
appropriation that a man-made diversion is necessary in order to
perfect water rights, at least as to agricultural uses. A logical
extension of this rule when water rights are purchased is that the
maintenance and use of a man-made diversion is necessary in order to
avoid the loss of water rights by abandonment or forfeiture.
A few cases, most notably in Colorado, have taken exception to the
5
general rule. The Colorado cases began with Thomas v. Guiraud
which contained dictum that diversion would be irrelevant if the
water were being successfully applied to beneficial use. 6 In the case of
Larimer Co. Reservoir Co. v. People ex rel. Luthe, Dist. Atty.,7 the
court solidified the Thomas dictum by holding that a natural
depression in a streambed may be used as a reservoir and the
contained waters legally appropriated without a man-made diversion.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals later held, in Empire Water &
Power Co. v. Cascade Town Co., 8 a case involving the aesthetic use of
a stream, that an appropriation based on natural flow should only be
denied if the use of such flow were found wasteful.
Counsel for Miranda relied upon the recent Colorado case of Town
of Genoa v. Westfall,9 which in turn rested on Thomas and Fort
3. N.M. Stat. Ann.§§75-1-1 et seq. (Repl. 1968).
4. 83 N.M. at 445, 493 P.2d at 411.

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

6 Colo. 530 (1883).
Id. at 533.
8 Colo. 614, 9 P. 794 (1886).
205 F. 123 (8th Cir. 1913). The case was one of Colorado law.
141 Colo. 533, 349 P.2d 370 (1960).
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Morgan Land & Canal Co. v. South Platte Ditch Co.10 In the latter
case there is language, as in the syllabus by the court, suggesting that
a diversion is a necessary prerequisite for appropriation but the facts
and the court's discussion of the case clearly indicate the holding to
be that an appropriation is only valid when based on actual beneficial
use. 1 Dictum that a diversion is a requirement appeared in Fort
Morgan and also in Farmers' High Line Canal & Reservoir Co. v.
Southworth,12 cited by the Fort Morgan court, undoubtedly because
the diversions were already present and did not create an issue in
these cases. The only issue necessary to deciding all of these cases was
the issue of beneficial application, not the issue of diversion. Thus, the
courts' position suffered from overbreadth insofar as their discussions
indicate the necessity of diversion. This error in overbreadth was
present in the New Mexico case of Harkey v. Smith 13 in which
diversion was not even a purported issue, but the New Mexico
Supreme Court cited Harkey in Miranda for the enunciation of
principles of appropriation, among them, the necessity of diversion.
The Miranda court attempted to distinguish Genoa by correctly
reciting Colorado's beneficial use and intent requirements for perfection without diversion. The court then declared that grazing was not
the application of water to beneficial use nor did it evidence the
necessary intent to use beneficially. The court erred in assuming that
beneficial use or the lack of it was relevant to the Miranda case. The
case was limited to the issue of diversion, as the court itself admitted
in the first paragraph of its opinion. Beneficial use and intent, which
are general requirements for appropriation and which are not
peculiar to appropriation without diversion, should not have been
considered by the court. The court seems, however, to have first
decided that Miranda should not be allowed to have a favorable
decision because of the lack of beneficial use and intent. The court
then answered the question, "is diversion necessary?", as if the
question were that of beneficial use.
The court cited Walsh v. Wallace,14 a Nevada case which rejected
a water rights claim based on grazing because there was no diversion,
to support its contention that a diversion was necessary for the
appropriation of water. The Miranda court did not discuss Steptoe
Live Stock Co. v. Gulley 15 (although Miranda's counsel cited this case
10. 18 Colo. 1, 30 P. 1032 (1892).
11. Id. 30 P. at 1034. The court accepted the Larimer statement that "the true test of the
appropriation of water is the successful application thereof to the beneficial use designed."
12. 13 Colo. 111, 21 P. 1028 (1889).
13. 31 N.M. 521,247 P. 550(1926).
14. 26 Nev. 299, 67 P. 914 (1902).
15. 53 Nev. 163, 295 P. 772 (1931).
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in his brief) in which the Nevada Supreme Court in effect overruled
the Walsh holding by allowing the appropriation of water based on
watering of livestock without a diversion. In Walsh, the Nevada court
had been concerned with eradicating any supposed elements of the
riparian doctrine in Nevada and the justices apparently felt that use
without diversion was such an element (they did not decide the issue
of whether grazing was beneficial use). The Steptoe court attempted
to distinguish Walsh by assuming that a diversion was necessary for
6
irrigation.'
The Utah Supreme Court has also misconceived the assertion of a
water right without diversion as riparian in nature and then rejected
the claim because the riparian doctrine was not recognized in Utah. 17
The Idaho Supreme Court made the same error, 18 but the Oregon
Supreme Court escaped the trap when it allowed the perfection of
water rights based on natural irrigation. 19 Samuel Wiel, author of
Water Rights in the Western States, 20 also seems to have feared that
claims based on use without diversion were proceeding under the
riparian doctrine and he made the same error that the Nevada (in
Walsh), Utah, and Idaho courts made, namely, deciding the issue on
the supposed proper form rather than on the substance of the
appropriation doctrine.
The substance of the appropriation doctrine is beneficial use.
Diversion may serve to put potential water users on notice of prior
appropriations and there is also the argument that diversions prevent
some waste of water resources. The water permit system now
provides notice to potential water users and apparently obviates that
element of the argument for man-made diversions. 21 As to waste, the
state engineers generally have sufficient power independent of the
diversion requirement to enjoin wasteful acts and to require procedures for avoiding waste. 2 2
Some uses are efficient without a man-made diversion. Examples
might include stock-watering, recreational use, and fish culture.
Over-appropriation of water in the various basins does not moot the
16. Id. 295 P. at 774.
17. Hardy v. Beaver County Irr. Co., 65 Utah 28, 234 P. 524 (1924).
18. Hutchinson v. Watson Slough Ditch Co., 16 Idaho 484, 101 P. 1059 (1909).
19. In re Water Rights in Silvies River, 115 Or. 27, 237 P. 322 (1925). Oregon has a combined
riparian-appropriation system of water rights and, as a result, this case may be of limited
persuasiveness in "pure" appropriation states.
20. S. Wiel, supra note 1.
21. Water permit systems do not presently supply complete information on actual or
intended appropriations, but this hardly vitiates the argument that the permit supersedes the
diversion as an information source since direct observation is a more unsatisfactory method of

ascertaining water rights. Any failings of a permit system can be corrected.
22. See, e.g., N.M. Stat. Ann. §§75-5-5 to -6, -37 (Repl. 1968).
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issue because water rights are saleable and an old use perfected with a
diversion may be converted to a use for which a diversion would be

superfluous. The requirement of a diversion where none is needed is
economically inefficient and burdensome as well as unfair and
prejudicial in its legal consequences. Such a requirement is economically inefficient because the same amount of product is created at
greater cost; burdensome because it forces a capital outlay by a
person who often cannot afford such an expenditure; unfair because it
forces a class of water users to take an otherwise unnecessary action
that is perhaps required because the other classes of water users have
found a diversion necessary regardless of any legal requirement;
prejudicial because it denies uses that may require that no diversion
be made.
If a conservation organization bought a canyon and all the water
rights needed to assure the natural flow of water through the canyon
and a court were willing to define the club's recreational use and
preservation of the natural area as beneficial use, the organization
would nevertheless lose its water rights if the diversion rule were
strictly followed. 23 It is true that the New Mexico Supreme Court
limited its ruling to agricultural cases, but in light of stock-watering
that holding should be overruled. Furthermore, if the Miranda
holding is not overruled, the holding may be extended to non-agricultural cases in the future.
The Miranda holding and the general rule requiring diversion are
unnecessary embellishments of the appropriation doctrine and have
undesirable effects. The courts need only look for intent to use the
water beneficially, the time of appropriation, actual application to
23. For other discussions of diversions re recreation see Ellis, Watercourses-Recreational
Uses for Water Under PriorAppropriation Law, 6 Natural Resources J. 181 (1966); Comment,
Water AppropriationFor Recreation, 1 Land & Water L. Rev. 209 (1966). Willis Ellis's article is
a critique of Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. Rocky Mountain Power Co., 158 Colo.
331, 406 P.2d (1965), a case in which the Colorado Supreme Court erroneously stated that
"There is no support in the law of this state for the proposition that a minimum flow of water
may be 'appropriated' . . . without diversion.
... The court did not discuss Thomas v.
Guiraud,supra note 5, or the other Colorado cases holding otherwise, supra notes 7 and 8. To
support its position, the court cited City and County of Denver v. N. Colorado Water
Conservancy Dist., 130 Colo. 375, 276 P.2d 992 (1954), in which diversion was not an issue but
which did cite Windsor Reservoir & Canal Co. v. Lake Supply Ditch Co., 44 Colo. 214, 98 P. 729
(1908), which contains the unsubstantiated statement that "it has been repeatedly decided in
this jurisdiction that an 'appropriation' consists of an actual diversion of water from a natural
stream, followed within a reasonable time thereafter by an application thereof to some
beneficial use." The other case cited by the Colorado River Water Conservancy Dist. court
seems to substantiate the court's position since in that case, Board of County Comm'rs v. Rocky
Mountain Water Co., 102 Colo. 351, 79 P.2d 373 (1938), it was assumed that diversion was a
critical element in appropriation. Board of County Comm'rs is poor support because it did not
involve a non-diversionary use. Even if it were conceded that prior Colorado cases support the
diversion rule, that concession would only lend support to what the law might have been and
not to what the law should be.
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beneficial use, and conformance with statutory law in order to give
the appropriation doctrine its proper reach. Miranda should be
overruled and the diversion rule eliminated from the appropriation
doctrine. The appropriation doctrine would then be more economically efficient and less burdensome as well as be legally fairer and less
prejudicial.
CHANNING R. KURY

